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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 960702-CA

JOHN MICHAEL TETMYER,

:

Priority No. 2

Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION mV NATURE OF PRQCESPIN3S
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1996).

This Court has jurisdiction

over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that, under the
totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion justified the
stop of defendant's vehicle?
w

[W]hether a particular set of facts gives rise to

reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness."
939 (Utah 1994).

State v, Pena. 869 P.2d 932,

This standard, however, "conveys a measure of

discretion to the trial judge."

Id.

While the reviewing court's

examination will fall short of a de novo review, it must still be
sufficient "to assure that the purposes of the reasonablesuspicion requirement are served."

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 (1993), governing open
containers of alcoholic beverages in motor vehicles, provides in
part:
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic
beverage while operating a motor vehicle or
while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether
the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on
any highway.
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess,
transport, or allow another to keep, carry,
possess, or transport in the passenger
compartment of a motor vehicle, when the
vehicle is on any highway, any container
which contains any alcoholic beverage if the
container has been opened, its seal broken,
or the contents of the container partially
consumed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance (mushrooms), a third degree felony; possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), possession of paraphernalia,
and driving under the influence, all class B misdemeanors; and an
open container violation, a class C misdemeanor (R. 1-2). He

2

moved to suppress all evidence (R. 14-15).

After an evidentiary

hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 84). Defendant
subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the single
felony count, and all other charges were dismissed (R. 27-33, 3435) . The court then imposed and stayed a prison sentence and
ordered defendant to serve 24 months of informal probation and
pay a fine of $1480 (R. 34-35).

This timely appeal followed (R.

36) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
When reviewing a lower court's decision denying a
defendant's motion to suppress, this Court will "recite the facts
in a light most favorable to the lower court's findings."

State

v. Montoya. 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 54, 54 (Utah App. 1997) (citing
State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 1996)).
Rick Eldredge, a Utah Highway Patrol trooper, and Jim
Eberling, a Monticello city police officer, were sitting in a
window booth at the Trailside convenience store in Monticello,
when Eldredge saw an individual approach and almost fall as he
went up the steps to the store, wvery unsure of himself," and
then head directly for the bathrooms (R. 52-53, 54, 61, 63, 65).
This individual, who had alighted from the passenger side of a
car parked at the gas pumps, had "very red, glassy eyes," was
3

"staggering off line," and appeared to be "very intoxicated" (R.
53-54, 63). On the way back out of the store, he nearly fell
down the steps again (R. 53).
Eldredge brought this activity to the attention of Officer
Eberling, who also began to watch (R. 53). Eberling confirmed
that the passenger was staggering and that he was unsure of his
footing:

"You could see he was very deliberate with his walking,

looking at the ground, making sure he watched his steps" (R. 66).
Defendant, meanwhile, was gassing up the car. According to
Eberling, he was "using the car as a balance point with his hand.
And when he'd move away from it, you could see he was a little
unsteady, and he'd put his hand back down on the car" (R. 66).
After defendant finished fueling his vehicle, he came into
the store, wearing "very dark sunglasses," which he kept on while
in the dark store (R. 53). He, too, headed straight for the
bathroom and "appeared to be walking offline" (Id.).

Defendant

then bought a few items and left the store (R. 62).
Meanwhile, Officer Eberling asked Trooper Eldredge if he
could borrow a camera, and the two of them went outside to the
trunk of Eldredge's vehicle to get it (R. 53). Eberling took the
camera and drove out of the parking lot just before defendant and
his passenger pulled out (R. 54). Soon thereafter, Eldredge
4

hurriedly closed his trunk and also left.

He caught up with

defendant's vehicle at the edge of town and stopped it (R. 54).
Defendant ultimately was found in possession of controlled
substances, paraphernalia, and open containers.

However, because

only the initial stop is at issue, no other facts are relevant to
the disposition of this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The officer in this case stopped defendant's vehicle after
observing the following conduct at a convenience store: 1) the
passenger who alighted from the vehicle was obviously
intoxicated, as revealed by a staggered gait, missteps, and red,
glassy eyes; 2) defendant was walking "off line," with "somewhat
of a stagger"; 3) defendant and the passenger both made a beeline
for the restroom at the convenience store; and 4) defendant
continued to wear his dark sunglasses while in the store.
These four factors, when viewed together, are sufficient to
justify the stop for either an open container violation or
driving under the influence.

Defendant's argument to the

contrary is flawed because he considers innocent behaviors -factors 3 and 4 -- in isolation.

This is directly contrary to

the totality of the circumstances test appropriate for assessing
reasonable suspicion and is contrary to Utah precedent.
5

In

addition, defendant incorrectly asserts that the passenger's
intoxication is irrelevant to the reasonable suspicion
determination because it does not implicate defendant in any
criminal activity.

Indeed, it is directly relevant to an open

container violation and served as a "red flag" to the officer in
assessing whether defendant, too, might be intoxicated.

Finally,

defendant improperly seeks to revisit the credibility
determination made by the trial court concerning the testimony of
the arresting officer.

Given the record in this case, deference

to the trial court is especially appropriate.

ARSUMENT
CONSIDERED IN COMBINATION, THE FOUR
FACTORS ARTICULATED BY OFFICER
ELDREDGE CREATED A REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS
COMMITTING AN ALCOHOL-RELATED
OFFENSE
Under the Fourth Amendment, a vehicle stop may be justified
by one of two rationales.

First, a stop is justified if an

officer sees a traffic violation being committed.

Second, as is

the case here, a vehicle stop is justified if it is "based on
specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences derived
from these facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude
that the occupant of the vehicle had committed, or was about to

6

commit a crime."

State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App.

1994), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).

The officer must

be able to point to facts which, "taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

Courts will examine the

totality of the circumstances present at the time of the stop to
determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal
activity.

See State v. Nguyen. 878 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah App.

1994) .
In this instance, Trooper Eldredge articulated four specific
facts that, together, aroused his suspicion that defendant and
his passenger had been drinking and, thus, justified the stop of
defendant's vehicle: 1) defendant's passenger was "very
intoxicated," as evidenced by his staggering gait and red, glassy
eyes (R. 53, 54); 2) defendant, the less obviously impaired of
the two, "wasn't walking normal [sic], just appeared like he
wasn't handling himself very well, somewhat of a stagger" (R. 54,
64);

3) defendant and his passenger made a beeline for the

bathroom (R. 63); and 4) defendant continued to wear his very
dark sunglasses while in a dark store (R. 53).
Defendant claims that Trooper Eldredge was acting on nothing
more than a "hunch" when he initiated the stop of defendant's
7

vehicle.

He argues that the passenger's intoxication did not

implicate defendant in any criminal activity and so "adds little
to the reasonable suspicion analysis" (Br. of App. at 8). He
also asserts that because wearing sunglasses indoors and heading
directly for the bathroom at a convenience store are consistent
with innocent behavior, they cannot lend support to an inference
of unlawful behavior (Id.).

Finally, defendant seeks to revisit

the credibility determination made by the trial court concerning
the testimony of Trooper Eldredge and Officer Eberling as it
related to signs of intoxication exhibited by defendant (Br. of
App. at 9-10).
Defendant's argument fails for several reasons.

First, the

passenger's obvious intoxication is not irrelevant to the
officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in
alcohol-related criminal behavior.

The passenger's intoxication

is an important fact giving rise to reasonable suspicion that: 1)
defendant was violating the open container law; or 2) defendant
was driving under the influence of alcohol.1

1

The trial court addressed both of these grounds. It
first found that a brief detention was justified to determine if
defendant was driving under the influence. The court described
this decision as "a close case" (R. 82 or addendum A ) . Second,
the trial court found that the officer was justified, "probably
on firmer ground," to stop the vehicle to determine if there were
8

The open container law makes it illegal for a passenger to
drink any alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle, regardless of
whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on a highway.
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20(1)(1993). If the officer has
reason to suspect that the passenger is violating the law, the
officer is justified in stopping the driver of the vehicle in
which the passenger is riding.

Cf. State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120,

122, 123 (Utah 1976)(police justified in stopping driver of
vehicle where they had warrant of arrest for passenger).
The open container law, however, goes further than simply
forbidding passengers from drinking alcohol in vehicles.

The law

also makes it illegal for a driver to allow a passenger to keep,
carry, possess, or transport an open container of alcohol in the
passenger compartment of his car.
44.20 (2) (1993).

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-

Thus, even assuming arguendo that defendant had

not been drinking at all in the vehicle, his passenger's obvious
intoxication under the circumstances presented here could
reasonably lead an officer to suspect that defendant was
violating the open container law by permitting a passenger to
either drink or have an open container of alcohol in the vehicle.

open containers (R. 83).
9

See State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1991)(reasonable
suspicion of open container violations as to passenger and driver
where officer sees can of beer on trunk of car, open passenger
door, and man urinating).
The inference of an open container violation in this case is
supported not by the passenger's intoxication alone, but also by
considering the quick trips to the bathroom by both individuals,
facts that

ux

by reason of simple biology"' support the

articulable suspicion of an alcohol-related offense.

See Davis.

821 P.2d at 11. As this Court has noted: "In developing a
reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers are
entitled to reach 'common-sense conclusions about human
behavior.'"

State v. Smith. 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App.

1992)(quoting United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct.
1581, 1585 (1989) ) .
In a totality of the circumstances analysis, the passenger's
obvious intoxication is also highly relevant to the officer's
reasonable suspicion that defendant might be driving under the
influence.2

Indeed, the passenger's intoxication was the central

2

Defendant also argues that the passenger's intoxication
should be irrelevant to reasonable suspicion of driving under the
influence because it would have *a chilling effect" on the
willingness of individuals to serve as designated drivers (Br. of
10

factor that triggered Trooper Eldredge's closer scrutiny of the
entire situation before him (R. 53) . The trial court recognized
the importance of the passenger's drunkenness to the overall
assessment by noting, of the driver's "walking not in a straight
line coming into the store": "It's something that [Trooper
Eldredge] may not have really paid attention to were it not for
the obviously intoxicated condition of the passenger" (R. 81 or
addendum A).

The passenger's drunkenness served, in essence, as

a red flag, alerting the officer to carefully scrutinize the
entire situation.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, then, the

passenger's intoxication was highly relevant to the reasonable
suspicion determination.
Second, defendant cites two instances of innocent behavior,
asserting that such behavior cannot constitute a rational basis
for inferring criminal conduct.

Particularly, he focuses on the

haste with which he and his passenger headed for the bathroom and
his failure to remove his sunglasses inside the store.

He argues

that these behaviors cannot provide a rational basis for

App. at 9). Certainly, as the trial court noted, this could be a
concern (R. 82). But if officers and reviewing courts adhere to
the totality of the circumstances test, taking into account not
only the passenger's condition, but also the designated driver's
apparent sobriety and any other relevant circumstances,
defendant's "chilling effect" will remain unrealized.
11

inferring either that he or his passenger were drinking or that
he was seeking to hide bloodshot eyes (Br. of App. at 8).
The problem with defendant's argument is that he considers
these facts individually, isolating them from the totality of the
circumstances in order to highlight their innocuousness.

The

possibility of an innocent explanation for a particular behavior
does not negate the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
that may grow from an officer's assessment of the entire
situation with which the officer is faced.

See State v. Poole.

871 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1994)(discussing same principal in
analogous context of probable cause determination). Indeed, this
Court has noted that "where a defendant's conduct is 'conceivably
consistent with innocent . . . activity,' but is also 'strongly
indicative' of criminal activity, we will not hesitate to
conclude that reasonable suspicion exists."

Provo City Corp. v.

Spotts. 861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993)(citation omitted).
Furthermore, this Court has acknowledged that "a trained law
enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the
untrained observer."

State v. Trujillor 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah

App. 1987)(citing United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 564
(1980)).
12

In this case, the trial court recognized that the two facts
seized upon by defendant were "insufficient in and of themselves,
and I think insufficient even the two of them combined to justify
suspicion" (R. 81). However, when the trial court considered
these two individually innocent objective facts in conjunction
with the passenger's obvious intoxication and the driver's
apparent unsteadiness, a different gloss on the facts emerged,
permitting the trial court to conclude that all of the facts
together indicated the likelihood of criminal activity (R. 8182).

That is, factors that had no particular significance in

isolation -- such as making a beeline for the bathroom, wearing
sunglasses inside, or even uwalking off-line" -- when viewed
together and in light of the passenger's obvious drunkenness,
formed a reasonable basis for inferring a likely alcohol-related
offense.

The trial court's ruling thus properly analyzed the

facts as a collective whole in order to determine that the
officer was justified in making a brief investigatory stop to
confirm or dispel his suspicion.

See State v. Humphrey. 314 Utah

Adv. Rep. 48, 52 (Utah App. 1997)(innocent behaviors combined to
justify reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle).
Finally, defendant seeks to revisit the trial court's
assessment of witness credibility (Br. of App. at 9-10).
13

In a

suppression hearing, the trial court acts as the trier of fact
and, as such, is "authorized to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and to believe or disbelieve any witness."

State v.

Carlgen, 638 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1981), cert, denied. 455 U.S.
958 (1982).

"Because of the trial court's position of advantage

to observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors bearing on
credibility, [a reviewing court] will not disturb its factual
assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a suppression
motion unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in
error."

State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)(footnote

omitted).
In this case, in assessing Trooper Eldredge's testimony, the
court did not, as defendant asserts, "relieve . . . [him] of the
obligation to point to specific and articulable facts" (Br. of
App. at 10). To the contrary, after Trooper Eldredge had been
questioned both on direct and cross-examination and had
articulated the four factors already discussed, the court pressed
him even further, asking him to demonstrate how defendant was
walking (R. 63). The following colloquy occurred:
The Court:

Can you demonstrate the way he was
walking?

Witness:

Get down and demonstrate?

14

The Court:

Uh huh [indicating affirmative] .

Witness:

[The witness gets down from the witness
stand.] The first guy or the driver?

The Court

The driver.

Witness:

He stepped up on the curb something like
this [indicating], walked into the
bathroom, just wasn't walking normal,
just appeared like he wasn't handling
himself very well, somewhat of a
stagger.

The Court:

Well, you kind of stumbled like when you
indicated him stepping up on the curb.

Witness;

Yeah. He stumbled, caught himself,
almost fell down like the first guy.

The Court;

I don't understand what you mean by
offline.

Witness:

A person normally walks like this, okay
[indicating]. When I say offline, I'm
talking he's walking like this
[indicating]. [The witness resumes the
witness stand].

The Court:

All right.

(R. 63-64).

That's all I have.

In its ruling, the trial court acknowledged the

subtle abnormality in gait that the witness had demonstrated,
noting that only after seeing the passenger in an obviously
intoxicated state did defendant's more subtle impairment take on
significance in the eyes of the officer (R. 81). After
acknowledging this subtlety, as well as the corroborating

15

testimony of Officer Eberling, the court determined that Trooper
Eldredge was credible.
Here, the trial court saw the witnesses, had the opportunity
to assess them first-hand and, indeed, even asked follow-up
questions to clarify relevant testimony.

Under the

circumstances, the trial court's ruling cannot be said to be
against the clear weight of the evidence.
1258.

See Ashe. 745 P.2d at

Consequently, this Court should defer to the trial court's

credibility assessment and leave its ruling undisturbed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _ 4 _ day of June, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
9
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JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

16

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Rosalie Reilly, 148 South Main, #1, P.O. Box 404,
Monticello, Utah 84535, this ^f

day of June, 1997.

S}fc*«*

17

ADDENDUM A

1
2

people who walk into the Trailside or any other convenience store

3

wearing sunglasses and not taking them on when they walk into the

4

store. Because I wear sunglasses when I drive. They're prescription

5

sunglasses, and I don't change them to these glasses I'm wearing

6

today just' cause I walk inside the — a convenience store. I don't

7

want officers stopping people just because they make a beeline for

8

the restroom when they stop at a gas station. Those are both

9

innocent enough that certainly standing on their own, they are items

10

that do — that do not narrow down the field sufficiently to justify

11

stopping someone under those circumstances.

12

Those are indicators, light indicators, which are insufficient in ano]

13

of themselves, and I think insufficient even the two of them combined

14

to justify suspicion. When you add — In this case you add to that

15

someone who was walking — that wasn't walking straight. And I

16

recognize the difficulty of describing or even mimicking that behavior,

17

because it's kind of a thing that, who was it; Justice Steward or

18

Justice Powell said about obscenity: *You know it when you see it, butj

19

it's hard to describe. You know, you can kind of tell, but it's difficult

20

to describe why it is you think someone may be intoxicated.

21

And I think the officer has been fair in describing that this was

22

not obvious. It's something that he may not have really paid

23

attention to were it not for the obviously intoxicated condition of the

24

passenger. But, I think there's an indicator there, and I — I believe

25

the officer when he says that this fellow was not walking in a straight

M.JaneMusselman
Certified Court Transcriber
P.O. Box 531

THE COURT: Well, I don't want officers stopping

1

line. And I consider Officer Eberling's testimony in that regard simply

2

as an indicator that Trooper Eldredge is probably telling the truth

3

about that. Not that it's an independent item of information

4

communicated and considered by Trooper Eldredge, but that it

5

indicates that it was probably a correct observation.

6

And then we have the fourth factor of the obviously intoxicated

7

passenger. Now, that's perfect behavior as far as the driver is

8

concerned, but it does (and I don't want Troopers stopping everybody

9

who has somebody drunk as a passenger in their car. Otherwise,

10

what's the point of having a designated driver?), but this is another

11

indicator that there may be drinking going on in this car.

12

And so I focus first on the question of whether or not there was

13

reason to suspect, given these articulated facts, that the driver was

14

impaired. And I consider this one a close case, but I find that this

15

was reasonable suspicion. I think that when you have these factors,

16

these four factors, each of them light, the strongest of which may be

17

this walking not in a straight line coming into the store, I think when

18

you talk all of the together, I don't think it's too big of a burden on

19

society to permit officers in that circumstance to make a brief

20

detention to determine if people, like Mr. Tetmyer are — are driving

21

under the influence.

22

Now, in the event that this is — this is examined by a higher

23

court, I'm going to address the question of the open container

24

argument. I didn't hear anything from Trooper Eldredge that he went

25

through an analysis where he thought, "Gee, there's probably open

M. Jane Musselman
Certified Court Transcriber
P.O. Box 531
Monticello, Utah 84535

1

container here." However, if he had considered that question, I think

2

he would have been entitled to, probably on firmer ground, to stop

3

this vehicle to determine if there were open containers. I have ruled

4

before that where you have a passenger — where you stop a vehicle

5

and you have an intoxicated individual in the car, you can look for

6

open containers. I think I've ruled that before.
MS. REILLY: I think the court's referring to the State

7
8

v. Michael Patefield where we didn't have an obviously intoxicated

9

passenger. And I think the court ruled if you have somebody with the

10

smell of alcohol on them and missing beer containers, that that would

11

be probable cause to search.
THE COURT: Well, probable cause to search, that's a

12
13

lesser — that's a higher standard than reasonable suspicion.
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, that's the reason I quoted

14
15

the Scott case which that case basically says that even though he

16

didn't articulate that he was looking for open containers, the fact that

17

he had the legal ability to do so, doesn't preclude the court from

18

determining that he was justified, is one of the holdings. In Utah —

19

There's a Utah case that quotes that Supreme Court case.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, anyway, you can add

20

21

findings in there that there was — that the passenger was intoxicated,

22

clearly intoxicated, and that I find that it would have been

23

justification to consider whether there were open containers in the

24

vehicle.

25
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Now, this case is interesting to note that if Officer Eldredge or

?e

1

Trooper Eldredge just walked up to Mr. Tetmyer coming out of the

2

store, that probably would not even triggered any constitutional

3

analysis, because that would have been a Level One citizen/police

4

encounter, could have smelled his breath. But, you know, then you

5

may have the question of who was driving in order to make a DUI

6

case stick. You would have had to go through that process

7

determining who was driving this vehicle. So, I don't fault the officer

8

for making that judgment.

9
10

Okay, the Motion to Suppress is denied. Now, what do you want
to do? Do we have a trial date scheduled in this case?

n
12

MR. HALLS: I'm not aware of — I didn't bring my
calendar in. I don't know that we do.

13
14

MS. WOOD [secretary to county attorney]: We do.
Let me check.

15

MR. HALLS: We do?

16

THE COURT: Let's see. Has he plead?

17

MS. REILLY: Yes, he has, Your Honor. I believe at

18

the arraignment there's a Waiver of Appearance, and I entered a not

19

guilty plea. Excuse me, at the preliminary hearing.

20

THE COURT: Yeah. Actually, we have never

21

arraigned him. Come on up, Mr. Tetmyer. Everyone Is in agreement

22

that we can treat it as if the suppression hearing had occurred after

23

this arraignment?

24

MS. REILLY: I have no objection.

25

THE COURT: Mr. Tetmyer, — Do you waive the
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